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THE ROAD TO REFORM: JUDGES ON
JURIES AND ATTORNEYS
FranklinStrier*
I. INTRODUCrION

As perhaps never before, trial reform roils the litigation scene.
Policymakers in various states are considering numerous and diverse reform proposals.1 Such proposals do not arise in a vacuum;
they are responses to perceived deficiencies. This Article assesses
the judicial popularity of twenty of these proposals as measured by
the responses to a recent large-scale survey of the California judiciary. These findings are compared with prior large-scale judicial
surveys on several of the same proposed reforms.
For simplicity, the considered proposals can be categorized
into those dealing with juries and those addressing other trial reform topics. Public dissatisfaction with the jury system intensified
decidedly after several highly controversial jury verdicts in California, most notably the O.J. Simpson criminal trial.2 Shortly
thereafter California joined Arizona and New York in a farreaching reexamination of its jury system. Both California's judiof the system and
ciary and legislature studied the shortcomings
3
proposals.
reform
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* Professor of Law, California State University, Dominguez Hills; B.S., 1965,
Brooklyn College; J.D., 1969, Rutgers University. Professor Strier is the author of

Reconstructing Justice: An Agenda for Trial Reform (1994). The research for this

survey was partially funded by a grant from the California State University Research, Scholarship, and Creative Activities Awards Program.

1. See G. Thomas Munsterman, A Brief History of State Jury Reform Efforts, 79

JUDICATURE 216,218 (1996).
2. People v. Simpson, No. BA097211 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. County Oct. 3,

1995).
3. In 1995 the California Senate Judiciary Committee held hearings on jury reform to review a range of proposals directed at improving and strengthening the system. See generally STATE SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., JURY REFORM, July 27, 1995

(evaluating reforms to the California civil and criminal jury systems). The California

Judicial Council reviewed prior reports and established a Blue Ribbon Commission
on Jury System Improvement. See generally J. CLARK KELSO ET AL., FINAL REPORT
OF THE BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION

ON JURY SYSTEM IMPROVEMENT
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Recent jury reform proposals addressed the following topics:
*Treatment and Management
• court facilities
• treatment by court staff, judges, and attorneys
*jury fees and conditions of service
*Selection
*sources of the jury pool
exemptions policy
*peremptory challenges
-Structure

jury size
*unanimity requirement
- Performance
*pretrial orientation and instruction
*cognitive aids such as note taking and question
asking
• simplified final instructions
*deliberations
Dissatisfaction with juries, albeit a salient impetus to trial reform, is not the sole source of concern. Other trial issues, too numerous to itemize here, also draw much attention. Those resonating most relate to judicial administration and the role of the trial
attorney. The two areas often intersect, as illustrated by proposals
that expand the prerogatives of the trial judge to areas historically
the near-exclusive domain of the attorney, such as shared voir dire
or court-appointed expert witnesses. In adversarial trials generally, and in American courts in particular, attorneys-rather than
judges--control the trial inquiry. Jury selection, evidence presentation, argumentation, and determination of the scope of litigation
are exclusively within the attorney's bailiwick. A variety of complicated issues arise from such attorney domination, including the
permissible bounds of zealous advocacy, the effect of imbalances
in the skills of the opposing attorneys, and the impact of either on
jury decision making. This Article looks at particular reform proposals falling within the two categories heretofore delineated:
those seeking to improve jury competence and those countering
[hereinafter BLUE RIBBON COMM'N REPORT] (recommending reforms to the California civil and criminal jury systems).
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the undesirable effects of attorney domination.
Identifying remedial measures merely begins the reform process. Judicial approval is arguably a sine qua non for trial reform.
When significant changes in trial procedure are contemplated,
judges need to be involved in the formulation of the changes because it is the judges who will inevitably be integral to implementation. As the "three-strikes" experience in California illustrated,
if judges do not support a trial reform measure, implementation
will be problematic even when broad public approval exists.
Waxing intolerance towards repeat criminal offenders led to
California's 1994 three-strikes law.4 The law requires a sentence
of twenty-five years to life for certain felons with prior convictions.5 Two years after the law went into effect, however, nine
percent of such sentences had been imposed for petty theft,
thereby offending the sensibilities of many.6 Trial judges bridled
at the loss of traditional judicial discretion in sentencing; some refused to enforce the law.7 In 1996 the California Supreme Court
agreed with its trial court brethren, holding that allowing only
prosecutors, and not judges, to disregard prior convictions in
8
three-strikes cases violated the separation-of-powers doctrine.
The ruling left trial judges with discretion to grant leniency by
overlooking a felon's prior crimes. 9
In order to gauge judicial opinion of the reforms proposed
here, all California Superior Court judges were surveyed during
1994-95. California Courts of Appeal judges and California Supreme Court justices were also surveyed-to see if there were any
significant differences between trial and appellate judge attitudes.
The overall response rate was 37%. 10
4. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(b)-(i) (West Supp. 1996).
5. See id. § 667(e)(2)(A)(ii).

6. See Dan Morain, Democrats Offer Rival 3-Strikes Bill, L.A. TIMES, July 19,
1996, at A3, A25. Although petty theft itself is a misdemeanor, people who commit
petty theft and have a prior petty theft conviction face a felony conviction, rendering
them subject to a three-strikes sentence if they also have a record of serious or violent crimes. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(b)-(i).
7. See Jenifer Warren, Judge Says He'll Defy "3 Strikes" Sentencing Law, L.A.
TIMES, July 22, 1994, at Al, A23.

8. See People v. Superior Ct. (Romero), 13 Cal. 4th 497, 917 P.2d 628, 53 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 789 (1996).
9. See id. In reaction, Senator Tom Campbell, backed by the California District

Attorneys' Association, introduced a bill into the California State Senate to remove
most of that discretion. See S. 331, 1995-96 Reg. Sess. (Cal.) (defeated in the California Senate Committee on Criminal Procedure on July 16, 1996).
10. Response rates have been rounded to the nearest percent. The response rate
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The survey questionnaire identified twenty proposed reforms
addressing areas of perceived jury incompetence and the problem
of attorney domination in the form of mismatched attorneys or adversarial excess. The questions asked whether the respondents
"would" or "do" allow or favor greater use of the proposed
reforms. Possible answers were "Yes," "No," or "Sometimes."
"Yes" and "Sometimes" were considered affirmative responses.

Various majorities of respondents answered affirmatively to

roughly half-nine of twenty-of the proposed reforms. Because
no profound trial reform measure is likely to succeed without the
support of a majority of the judiciary, only those proposals which
received affirmative responses from a majority of the respondents
are discussed in this Article.11 The results are tabulated in the
Appendix. The questionnaire also invited respondents to elaborate-with open-ended comments-upon their answers or to suggest other means for improving jury competence or mitigating the
undesirable effects of attorney domination. 12
for trial judges was 37%-287 out of 772. The response rate for appellate justicesincluding California Supreme Court justices-was 32%-30 out of 94. Responses
were computer tabulated using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS),
a commercially available statistical analysis program.
11. A majority of the judges did not respond affirmatively to 11 of the 20 proposed reforms. The reforms and the corresponding percentages responding affirmatively were:
- Written preinstructions forjurors: 24%
- Written transcripts for jurors: 30%
*Videotaped copies of the testimony for the jurors: 39%
"Specially qualified jurors in complex cases-either in
criminal or civil cases (two questions): 28%
*Experimentation with a mixed lay-professional jury-either
in all cases or complex cases only (two questions): 32%
"In camera voir dire: 37%
•Uninterrupted opening narratives by witnesses: 40%
" A trial advocacy skills course required for admission to
the bar: 44%
- Restrictions on witness coaching: 15%.
12. Some of the open-ended comments raised noteworthy additional issues and
suggestions. They included: limiting or eliminating attorney voir dire in civil casesa recent California ballot initiative restricted attorney voir dire in criminal cases, see
Crime Victims Justice Reform Act, Initiative Measure Proposition 115 (approved
June 5, 1990) (sections pertaining to criminal voir dire codified at CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE §§ 223-223.5 (West Supp. 1996)); limiting the time allowed for attorneys to
present their cases; limiting or eliminating peremptory challenges; giving judges
more discretion to dismiss marginal cases; and using professional jurors. By far the
most popular, however, was the proposal to eliminate juries in complex civil cases.
Typical was the comment of Los Angeles County Judge John Zebrowski: "Juries are
often not competent to decide complex questions. In no other walk of life do we
purposely assign unqualified persons to determine important issues. Juries are good
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Part II of this Article discusses the reforms proposed for improving jury performance to which a majority of the surveyed
judges responded affirmatively. Part III does the same for reform
proposals relating to attorney domination. Part IV characterizes
the overall findings and suggests directions for future research.
II. IMPROVING JURY COMPETENCE
A. Improve Jury Orientation: Respondents Were
Asked if JurorCompetence Could and Should
13
Be Improved by Better Orientation
Two major national surveys studying the extent of public
knowledge of the courts concluded that "startling ignorance"
characterized the general public's level of awareness of court operations. 14 Better juror orientation could enhance jury competence by more effectively introducing and educating prospective
jurors to basic legal concepts and trial procedures. Current programs-which are now haphazard and vary from state to state,
county to county, and court to court-could be enlarged to more
for credibility questions and the like." Response to Reform Proposals Questionnaire, John Zebrowski, Superior Court Judge of Los Angeles County (subsequently
appointed to California Court of Appeal, Second District, on Oct. 17, 1995) (on file
with the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
13. See infra app., tbl. 1.
14. In 1977 the National Center for State Courts sponsored a study conducted by
Yankelovich, Skelly and White, Inc., to profile the American public's level of knowledge of the judicial system. Barry Mahoney et al., Courts and the Public: Some
Further Reflections on Data from a National Survey, in STATE COURTS: A
BLUEPRINT FOR THE FUTURE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE JUDICIARY 83, 92 n.2 (Theodore J. Fetter ed., 1978). The firm con-

ducted personal interviews with 1931 members of the general public. See id. at 84.
They found that "the public is, by and large, woefully ignorant of what most judges
and lawyers would consider to be basic rules and concepts governing the operation
of courts." Id at 87. The Yankelovich firm found this consistent with other surveys
that sought to ascertain the extent of public knowledge of the courts. See id.
In 1983 the Hearst Corporation followed up on the Yankelovich survey with
its own national survey and came to the same conclusion. See FRANK A. BENNACK,
JR., THE HEARST CORPORATION, THE AMERICAN PUBLIC, THE MEDIA & THE
JUDICIAL SYSTEM: A NATIONAL SURVEY ON PUBLIC AWARENESS AND PERSONAL

EXPERIENCE 3 (1983). Using remarkably similar language, the report concluded that
"[t]he American public.., is woefully uninformed about the operation of our courts
and the people who preside over them." Id. at 3. "Even more importantly," the report adds, "they are dangerously misinformed about some of the most fundamental
principles upon which our concept of justice is based." Id. As a salient example of
public misinformation, the survey revealed that fully half of the public did not understand or appreciate the legal concept of innocent until proven guilty. See id. at 5.
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substantive training sessions.
Courts may choose from a wide range of training and education programs to elevate juror sophistication. Handbooks, lectures, and audio-visual presentations ordinarily provide valuable
information. Handbooks are available to jurors on their first day
of service in most courts, but vary markedly in size, coverage, and
content. 15 Topics typically addressed include jury selection; the
functions of the attorneys, judge, and jury; trial procedure; jury
deliberations; and desired juror conduct.' 6 Other material may
discuss the difference between criminal and civil cases; challenges
for cause and peremptory challenges during jury selection; what
constitutes evidence; what is meant by an inference; and when jury
sequestration is necessary.' 7 The jury deliberations discussion may
address deliberation procedure, restrictions on discussing the case,
the meaning of the rule that the case must be decided on the evidence only, and the role of the foreperson.' 8
Orientation lectures vary as much as the handbooks. Lectures
may be given by a judge or a jury clerk. 19 Whether the lecture will
be lengthy or brief, comprehensive or sketchy, administratively or
legally oriented, detailed or abstract, depends on the identity of
the lecturer and the time available. 20 The most effective lectures
are those that are given by judges and that emphasize the importance of jury duty, explain the basic nature of the trial while
avoiding sophisticated concepts, indicate the inherent uncertainties
of the trial process, and do not reiterate information given in the
handbook or audio-visual presentation.
Handbooks and audio-visual presentations have certain advantages over live lectures. They provide uniform information to
all prospective jurors, usually speak to the most frequently asked
questions, and do not consume the time of court personnel.
Overall, well-executed orientations can convey essential information to prospective jurors while mitigating any apprehensions they
may have about jury service. Such better prepared jurors tend to
perform their duties more effectively, often to the satisfaction of
15. See G. THOMAS MUNSTERMAN ET AL., NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE
COURTS, METHODOLOGY MANUAL FOR JURY SYSTEMS: IN SUPPORT OF THE LEAA
INCENTIVE PROGRAM IN JUROR USAGE AND MANAGEMENT 5-3 (1981).

16. See id. at 5-3 to 5-4.
17. See id. at 5-4 to 5-5.

18. See id. at 5-5.
19. See id.
20. See id.
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the jurors themselves.
In California the jury commissioner is statutorily charged with

the obligation to provide orientation for new jurors. 21 Orientation

videotapes are used in Los Angeles and Sacramento.22 Both convey information about the historical development of the jury system, the importance of juries in our constitutional system of government, the basic differences between civil and criminal cases, the
role of the various participants in the court system, the process of
jury selection and voir dire, the order of proof, and the deliberative function.Z3 The California Blue Ribbon Commission on Jury
System Improvements (Blue Ribbon Commission) recommended
that the California Judicial Council, to which the Blue Ribbon
Commission reported, produce a "statewide juror orientation
videotape which can be used by jury commissioners, with or without modification, to satisfy the statutory obligation to provide juror orientation." 24 Several judges in the survey gave open-ended
responses extolling the value of orientation. For example, Judge
Jeffrey Gunther of Sacramento County wrote: "I do an extensive
juror orientation and have found that it has great benefits."5
Judge Richard Neidorf of Los Angeles County adds: "If done
properly [orientation] could solve lots of problems, including unnecessary hung juries. The Judicial Council and/or State Bar
should have a standardized orientation state wide." 26
B. Preinstruction:Respondents Were Asked if They Would or Do
Allow Jurorsto Hearthe Judge's InstructionsBefore-as Well as
After-Evidence-Taking27
As if the wording of judicial instructions on the law were insufficiently troublesome to jurors, trial practice compounds the
problem with timing strictures. Current trial procedure withholds
nearly all of the substantive law from the jurors until after they
21. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 214 (West Supp. 1996).
22. See BLUE RIBBON COMM'N REPORT, supra note 3, at 80.
23. See id. at 80-81.

24. Id at 81 (Recommendation 5.1).
25. Response to Reform Proposals Questionnaire, Jeffrey Gunther, Superior
Court Judge of Los Angeles County (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Law
Review) [hereinafter Gunther Response].
26. Response to Reform Proposals Questionnaire, Richard Neidorf, Superior
Court Judge of Los Angeles County (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Law
Review).
27. See infra app., tbl. 2.
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hear all the evidence. The objective is to keep them open to all in-

formation. Whether that objective is met is uncertain. What is
certain is that this ignorance-imposing stricture denies jurors the
capacity to discriminate the key factual issues from the mass of information they receive. They must interpret the evidence without
a sense of the legal requirements that must be met by the parties.

Essentially, the rules of the game are unknown to the jurors until
the game is over. Envision being the scorekeeper of an athletic
contest without knowing what acts receive points or penalties until
after the conclusion of the game. An already difficult task thus becomes harder.

Giving the jurors a preliminary version of the instructions before-in addition to after-the evidence is heard can rectify this

problem.

Some states already require this.28

Judge William

Schwarzer, Director of the Federal Judicial Center, calls these instructions "the logical corollary to the lawyers' opening statements." 29 Studies consistently show that preinstructing jurors with
a preliminary charge before hearing the evidence would greatly

facilitate various aspects of jury performance, such as improving

31
juror integration of law and facts, 30 enhancing juror recall, im-

proving juror focus on the relevant issues, enhancing jurors'
chances of applying the correct rule to the evidence, 32 reducing juror questions during deliberations, 33 creating more informed ver-

dicts, 34 and increasing juror satisfaction. 35 Further, researchers

28. See, e.g., ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 18.6(c) ("Immediately after the jury is sworn, the
court shall instruct the jury concerning ...

the elementary legal principles that will

govern the proceeding.").
29. William W. Schwarzer, Reforming Jury Trials, 132 F.R.D. 575,583 (1991).
30. See Amiram Elwork et al., JuridicDecisions: In Ignorance of the Law or in
Light of It?, 1 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 163, 163 (1977); Saul M. Kassin & Lawrence S.
Wrightsman, On the Requirements of Proof- The Timing of JudicialInstruction and
Mock Jury Verdicts, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 1877, 1877 (1979); E.

Barrett Prettyman, Jury Instructions-Firstor Last? 46 A.B.A. J. 1066 (1960); Vicki
Lyn Smith, The Psychological and Legal Implications of Pre-Trial Instruction in the
Law (1987) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford Univ.).
31. See Elwork et al., supra note 30, at 169-77.
32. See Amiram Elwork & Bruce D. Sales, Jury Instructions, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EVIDENCE AND TRIAL PROCEDURE 280, 291 (Saul Kassin & Lawrence
Wrightsman eds., 1985).
33. See Leonard Sand & Steven Reiss, A Report on Seven Experiments Conducted by District CourtJudges in the Second Circuit,60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 423, 439-42
(1985).
34. See Commission on Fed. Courts, New York State Bar Ass'n, Improving Jury
Comprehensionin Complex Civil Litigation, 62 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 549,553 (1988).
35. See Jury Comprehension in Complex Cases, 1989 A.B.A. LITIG. SEC. 49-52.
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Larry Heuer and Steven Penrod found in a 1989 survey of Wisconsin judges that the judges expressed more satisfaction with the
verdicts of preinstructed juries and that preinstruction made the
trial fairer. 36 Moreover, the judges stated that the anticipated disadvantages-that preinstruction disrupts the trial, adversely effects
jury performance, or is impractical--did not materialize. 37 Despite
these favorable empirical findings of behavioral science, few courts
have yet to adopt this sensible reform.
To preinstruct without prejudice to either party, the court
should require attorneys to submit proposed instructions to the
court at the outset of trial. The judge can then apprise the jury of
the basic uncontested legal doctrines involved. The Blue Ribbon
Commission recommended that trial judges, in their discretion,
38
preinstruct the jury on the substantive law involved in the case.
In surprising contrast with the results of this question, where
80% answered affirmatively that jurors should hear preinstructions, only 23% thought that jurors should be allowed to see written preinstructions. Also noteworthy about the responses to the
latter question is that it is the only one showing a significant disparity between trial and appellate judges. Though only 21% of the
trial judges said they would allow jurors to see preinstructions, a
majority-52%-of the appellate justices answered affirmatively.
Further research may ascertain the cause of this disparity.
C. JurorQuestions: Respondents Were Asked if They Would or
Do Allow Jurorsto Ask Questions39
The primary means of trial investigation-witness interrogation-is typically denied to the jury. 40 One might believe, there36. See Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Instructing Jurors: A Field Experiment
with Written and Preliminary Instructions, 13 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 409, 409-30
(1989) [hereinafter Heuer & Penrod, InstructingJurors].

37. See id. at 427-30. Research also indicates that the vast majority of jurors cannot suspend their decision until the end of the trial. See Robert Forston, Sense and
Non-Sense: Jury Trial Communication, 1975 BYU L. REV. 601, 612. Hence there is

a concern that preinstruction would further predispose the jurors to prejudge. But
one study found to the contrary:

Preinstructed jurors were more likely to defer

judgment. See generally Smith, supra note 30 (concluding that preinstruction enhances juror performance).
38. See BLUE RIBBON COMM'N REPORT, supra note 3, at 93 (Recommendation

5.6).
39. See infra app., tbl. 3.
40. See Lisa M. Harms, Comment, The Questioning of Witnesses by Jurors, 27
AM. U. L. REV. 127,132 (1977).
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fore, that the occasional allowance of juror questions is a new
trend. Yet English courts permitted juror interrogation as early as
the eighteenth century. 41 Moreover, juror questions were allowed

by a few American courts in the nineteenth century, with the
42

practice becoming formalized in the United States in the 1970s.
The court's authority to permit juror interrogation is clear.43
Nevertheless, jurors rarely get to question a witness.44 No state

affirmatively offers or encourages the practice, although a majority

of states permit the occasional request by a jury seeking to ask
questions on its own initiative. 45
Why not allow juror questions? After all, "while justice is
blind, jurors need not also be."' 46 From the jurors' perspective the
potential truth-seeking advantages of juror interrogation are obvious. Responses to juror questions can increase the information

upon which the jury decides by fleshing out neglected evidence,

clarifying the evidence and law, and identifying areas of misunder-

standing. 47 Furthermore, by involving jurors more in the trial
process, questions probably increase jurors' attention and interest

in the case 48 and alleviate their doubts about the testimony. 49 Attorneys benefit too. They can restructure their evidence presentation to improve juror understanding based upon the omitted and
misunderstood evidence revealed by the juror questions. 50 Juror
41. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW 685

(Bernard C. Gavit ed., Washington Law Book Co. 1941) (1892). For a detailed history of jury questions, see Harms, supra note 40.
42. See Michael Wolff, JurorQuestions: A Survey of Theory and Use, 55 Mo. L.
REv. 817,818 (1990).
43. See id. at 818-19.
44. See id. at 818.
45. See Jonathan M. Purver, Annotation, Proprietyof JurorsAsking Questions in
Open CourtDuring Course of Trial,31 A.L.R.3d 872, 877 (1970).
46. Michael A. McLaughlin, Questions to Witnesses and Notetaking by the Jury as
Aids in UnderstandingComplex Litigation, 18 NEW ENG. L. REV. 687, 697 (1983).
47. See Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Juror Notetaking and Question Asking
During Trials: A National Field Experiment, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 121, 142
(1994) [hereinafter Heuer & Penrod, JurorNotetaking].
48. See Wolff, supra note 42, at 824.
49. See Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, IncreasingJurors' Participationin Trials:
A Field Experiment with Jury Notetaking and Question Asking, 12 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 231, 237 (1988) [hereinafter Heuer & Penrod, Field Experiment]; Heuer &
Penrod, JurorNotetaking,supra note 47, at 125.
50. See The Honorable B. Michael Dann, "Learning Lessons" and "Speaking
Rights": Creating Educated and DemocraticJuries, 68 IND. L.J. 1229, 1253 (1993);
Heuer & Penrod, Field Experiment, supra note 49, at 231; Larry Heuer & Steven D.
Penrod, Some Suggestionsfor the CriticalAppraisalof a More Active Jury, 85 Nw. U.
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questions may also flag juror biases to the judge and attorneys,
thus facilitating corrective measures before jury deliberation when
it becomes too late.
On the rare occasions when juror questions are permitted, a
proposed question must first be approved by the judge. If approved, the judge usually gives the attorneys the opportunity to
object. Tactically, this can pose a Hobson's choice to the attorney
who objects to a juror's question: either risk offending the questioning juror or allow the introduction of possibly inadmissible and
potentially damaging evidence in response to the question. In the
latter event the only protection is the vigilance of the judge, who
cannot be presumed to catch all inappropriate questions before
they are answered nor all inadmissible testimony given in response
51
to an improper juror question.
The potential for upsetting traditional courtroom protocol is
inherent in juror -questions. They may result in surprises and destroy the attorney's strategy; they might become a nuisance to the
judge; and the jury might draw inappropriate inferences if an attorney successfully objects to a juror's question. Another key concern over juror questions is that, at least theoretically, they can
undermine juror impartiality. By asking questions, the juror may
become an advocate or may develop biases that threaten the integrity of the system. 52 Nonetheless, field studies by Heuer and
Penrod failed to confirm any of these concerns. 53 Judges on the
Blue Ribbon Commission who had permitted juror questions also
reported the absence of negative consequences. 54 Convinced that
the benefits of juror questions are real and the concerns largely
speculative, the Blue Ribbon Commission recommended that
judges advise jurors of their right to submit written questions. 55

L. REV. 226, 232 (1990); Hedieh Nasheri & Richard J. Rudolph, An Active Jury:
Should Courts EncourageJurorsto Participatein the QuestioningProcess?,16 AM. J.
TRIAL ADvoc. 109, 146-47 (1992).

51. See Wolff, supra note 42, at 826-28.
52. See id. at 829-30.
53. See Heuer & Penrod, Field Experiment, supra note 49, at 251-58; see also
Heuer & Penrod, Juror Notetaking, supra note 47, at 146-47 (finding that jurors do
not become advocates). Moreover, any of these concerns can be remedied on appeal. See Wolff, supra note 42, at 839 n.123.
54. See BLUE RIBBON COMM'N REPORT, supra note 3, at 85-86.

55. See id. at 86-88 (Recommendation 5.3).
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Use
D. Issue Separation: Respondents Were Asked if Greater
56
Should Be Made of Issue-SeparatedTrials
Current trial practice does not lend itself to juror comprehension of evidence because all issues are litigated at once. The evidence on all potential issues-no matter how lengthy, complicated,
or technical-is heard in one nonsegmented, continuous trial.
Partisan evidence presented by one side, often in disjointed segments, is separated by long delays from testimony on the same
subject from opposing counsel. The resulting hodgepodge confounds the logical ordering of evidence often necessary for jurors
to systematically consider and make findings on specific issues.
Complex cases exacerbate the problem. Jurors tend to confuse evidence in trials involving multiple parties, multiple causes of
they use evidence admitaction, or multiple offenses. As a result,
57
ted on one issue to resolve other issues.
A more juror-friendly approach would sever the trial issues.
Potentially dispositive issues could be presented first; evidence
from both sides could be heard and then resolved by the jury. In
this way the scope of subsequent issues could be narrowed, and the
need for some evidence would be obviated. Juries in both federal
courts and many state courts, for instance, commonly consider the
issues of liability separately before considering damages in a civil
case. 58 A finding of no liability eliminates the need for the jury to
hear any evidence related to damages. Experience also suggests
59
that a finding of liability will encourage the parties to settle.
But the separation of liability and damages merely scratches
the surface of possibilities. The liability issue, for example, can be
further subdivided into serial consideration of the evidentiary
components of duty, causation, and defenses. 60 This seriatim ex56. See infra app., tbl. 4.
57. See J. Alexander Tanford & Sarah Tanford, Better Trials Through Science: A
Defense of Psychologist-LawyerCollaboration,66 N.C. L. REV. 741,750 (1988).
58. See Schwarzer, supra note 29, at 594-95; Louis Harris and Associates, Inc.,
Judges' Opinions on ProceduralIssues: A Survey of State and FederalTrial Judges

Who Spent at Least Half Their Time on GeneralCivil Cases, 69 B.U. L. REv. 731, 743
(1989).
59. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LIGATION § 21.632 (3d ed. 1995).
60. When coupled with the use of special verdicts, discussed infra Part II.E, this
degree of issue separation could dramatically foreshorten civil trials. A special verdict finding of no duty or no causation, for example, would obviate the need to hear
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amination of issues should markedly enhance jury fact finding by
enabling the jury to focus on one issue at a time. Evidence thereby
becomes more orderly and understandable to the jurors. Even if
all the issues must eventually be considered, the jurors' cognitive
task is greatly simplified by mitigating the confusion that attends
processing evidence on multiple issues. The longer and more
complex the trial, the greater the potential benefits of issue separation. As longer trials become more commonplace, the appeal of
such severed-issue trials grows. The need is evident. From 1968 to
1988 the percentage of civil trials in federal court that took no
the number of trials lasting
more than one day was halved while
61
ten or more days almost quintupled.
Despite the potential advantages and availability 62 of issue
severance, it is rarely used.63 Yet a 1988 nationwide Harris poll of
1000 federal and state judges indicated strong judicial support for
the practice. 64 The overwhelming majority said they had granted
or required separation of issues and that, on balance, it helped
rather than hindered the process. 65 One key advantage they cited
was improving the fairness of the66outcome; another was expediting
settlements and the trial process.
In the present survey open-ended responses indicated several
California judges were of like mind. Judge Jeffrey Gunther, for
example, wrote that issue-separated trials "are shorter and settlement during the trial is more likely. '' 67 Not all judges were in consensus on this presumed benefit, however. Kern County Judge
Roger Randall said, "I believe that issue-separated trials denigrate
all further evidence. There is always the possibility that an appellate court would

reverse and remand, necessitating trial of the issues not presented to the jury. The
relatively low likelihood of this, however, should not preclude terminating delibera-

tions once the jury has made a dispositive decision.
61. See Stephen J. Adler, Can Juries Do Justice to Complex Suits?, WALL ST. J.,

Dec. 12, 1989, at B1, B6.
62. The federal courts and most state courts allow issue severance. See FED. R.

Civ. P. 42(b) (permitting issue severance); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 598 (West 1976
& Supp. 1997); HAW. R. Civ. P. 42(b); CoNN. R. Cr. § 133 (permitting cause of action severance but not issue severance).
63. See Louis Harris and Associates, Inc., supra note 58, at 743.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. Gunther Response, supra note 25. Opposition to this proposal more likely
originates from the bar than the bench. A 1988 study found that issue severance may
decrease the likelihood of a plaintiff verdict. See Doyle W. Curry & Rosemary T.
Snider, Bifurcated Trials: How to Avoid Them-How to Win Them, TRIAL, Mar.
1988, at 47.
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the intelligence of jurors to keep issues separate, and are a tremendous waste of courtroom resources. '68
E. Special Verdict Forms: Respondents Were Asked if Greater
Use Should Be Made of Special Verdict Forms69
A direct way for judges to improve jury competenceparticularly in complex cases where it is most needed-is to make
more use of special verdict forms: the special verdict or the general verdict plus interrogatories. 70 Both would reveal some obvious errors in jury fact finding and deliberation, and avoid other
mistakes. This has clear advantages. By allowing the judge to
monitor the jury, its inconsistent findings and consideration of irrelevant factors become conspicuous. Special verdict forms are
therefore more scientific than the commonly used general verdict
and would lead to fewer appellate reversals.
Using the special verdict, the judge asks the jury to make specific findings of fact to which the judge applies the law and renders
a verdict. 71 Judges are relieved of delivering lengthy and complex
instructions on legal doctrine, thus saving time. Similarly obviated
is the need for the jury to ponder the meaning and application of
legal jargon and concepts. Instead, the jury confines itself to that
for which it is better suited: resolving factual issues. Juries can
reasonably be expected to perform creditably if their function is
limited to such jobs as determining whether the plaintiff purchased
the defendant's product and used it as specified. An entirely less
sanguine prospect arises if lay jurors are given a crash course on a
complicated legal subject such as products liability-complete with
nuances and jargon-and then required to apply that law to the
facts as found. The longer and more legally convoluted the case,
the more improbable it is that jurors will successfully master and
apply the law. Curiously, the same jurors who, in the words of legendary Judge Curtis Bok, have been "treated like children while
the testimony is going on, [are] then.., doused with a kettleful of
law during the charge that would make a third-year law student
68. Response to Reform Proposals Questionnaire, Roger Randall, Superior
Court Judge of Kern County (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review)
[hereinafter Randall Response].

69. See infra app., tbl. 5.
70. See FED. R. Civ. P. 49 (authorizing both special and general verdicts).
71. See id.
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blanch." 72
One major caveat qualifies the potential benefits of the special
verdict. It denies the jury its traditional power to ignore the law in
the interest of justice-jury nullification. 73 Another less radical
special verdict form, the general verdict plus interrogatories, does
not directly affect the jury nullification power. Under this procedure the judge requests the jurors to answer specific questions to
see whether the jurors' verdict is consistent with their findings of
fact. 74 If not, several remedies are available. Under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, for example, the judge can order a new
trial, return the case to the jury for further consideration, or enter
a verdict consistent with the specific answers even if contrary to
the original verdict. 75
In a recent survey by Heuer and Penrod of 160 actual trials in
thirty-three states, the use of special verdict forms was found consistently beneficial.76 When special verdict forms were used, the
jurors reported feeling more informed, better satisfied, and more
confident that their special verdict reflected a proper understanding of the judge's instructions. 77 Furthermore, the jurors found the
special verdict most helpful in dealing with large quantities of in78
formation.

72. CURTIS BOK, I Too, NICODEMUs 261-62 (1946).

73. For a historical review and discussion of jury lawlessness, see MORTIMER R.
KADISH & SANFORD

H.

KADISH, DISCRETION TO DISOBEY

(1973); CHARLES

REMBAR, THE LAw OF THE LAND (1980); and Alan Scheflin & Jon Van Dyke, Jury
Nullification: The Contours of a Controversy, 43 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 51
(1980).
74. See FED. R. CIV. P. 49(b).

75. See id.
76. See Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Trial Complexity: A Field Investigation of
Its Meaningand Its Effects, 18 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 29,50 (1994) [hereinafter Heuer
& Penrod, Trial Complexity].

77. See id.
78. See id.
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III. ATTORNEY DOMINATION
A. Minimum Advocacy Skills. Respondents Were Asked if They
Favoreda Course in Trial Advocacy Skills as a Prerequisitefor an
Attorney to Represent a Client in Court79
Perhaps prodded by well-chronicled criticisms of trial counsel
ineptitude, 80 some states, including California, have considered
minimum advocacy skills training for trial attorneys.81 In addition
to raising the quality of court representation, proponents hope
such measures will mitigate the potential injustice that arises when
opposing attorneys are of significantly disparate competence. A
mismatch in attorney skills sabotages the assumption upon which
optimal functioning of the adversary system is predicated: roughly
equal competence of opposing counsel. One of the largest surveys
of juror attitudes towards the trial experience tested this premise.
Over 3800 individuals were polled upon completing their jury
service in Los Angeles during a six-month period ending in 1988.82
A single set of findings was the perceived effect of mismatched attorney skills on trial outcome. Over one-half, 56%, felt mismatching can affect trial outcomes, and over one-third, 35%, said mis83
matching did affect the outcome of the trial they actually sat on.
Furthermore, almost two-fifths, 37%, thought that the difference

in attorney skills was anywhere from "partly" to "completely" responsible for a "wrong decision" by the jury they sat on.84

79. See infra app., tbl. 6. A related question asked if the respondents favored the
same trial advocacy course as a prerequisite for admission to the bar; that is, to be
required of all attorneys rather than just litigation attorneys. The judges were decidedly less enthusiastic about this proposal-only 43% responded affirmativelypresumably considering it unnecessarily broad.
80. In a famous critique former Chief Justice of the United States Warren Burger
decried the lack of skills among trial advocates. See Warren E. Burger, The Special
Skills of Advocacy: Are Specialized Trainingand Certificationof Advocates Essential
to Our System of Justice?, 42 FORDHAM L. REv. 227, 227 (1973). Along with other
inadequacies, he emphasized the lack of skill in direct and cross-examination and the
time wasted in developing irrelevant facts. See id. at 234-35.
81. See Jean Guccione, LACBA Opposes Proposal to Require Skills Training,
L.A. DAILY J., Dec. 14, 1990, at 18.
82. See Franklin Delano Strier, Through the Jurors' Eyes, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1988, at
79 (1988). The reported findings are subject to an important caveat: Merely because
jurors believe something to be true does not make it true. These results show what
jurors say they experienced and believe. There was no independent validation of the
accuracy of juror perceptions, nor is it clear there could be.
83. See id. at 80.
84. See id.
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Open-ended comments in the present survey shed more light
on the judges' views of mismatching and trial attorney competence
in general. Judge Roger Randall opined that "in the real world
there will never be parity[,] ... but speciality training in trial techniques will be a step in the right direction. '8 5 Riverside County
Judge Charles Field observed:
The attorney courtroom competence issue is one with farreaching implications for the whole system.... The lack
of courtroom skills affects an attorney's ability to properly
evaluate the case for settlement or alternative resolution,
and affects their abilities to reasonably advise their clients, which is also a critical factor in expectations
86
(generally it precludes sensible resolution).
Judge Field goes beyond passive acceptance of this state of affairs. When, in his view, the attorneys "haven't a clue as to what's
going on," he gives them a trial outline.8 7 Judge Field reflects the
views of many other respondents-indicated by open-ended narrative responses-who feel that attorney incompetence is of far
greater concern than jury incompetence.
A heuristic model for the minimum skills program is the English barrister system. Barristers are litigation specialists. A barrister system, or a facsimile, would mitigate attorney mismatching of
the sort found in many American courts, Using specialists on both
sides potentiates the functioning of the adversary system and, with
88
it, the chances of a just result.
Santa Cruz County Judge Thomas Black's comments are representative of those supporting the advocacy skills course proposal
as a substitute for, or version of, the barrister system: "I think trial
attorneys should be qualified as such-much like English Barristers-intern for 3-5 years. And only those certified may try cases
to the bench! The playing field would be leveled[,] the quality of

85. Randall Response, supra note 68.
86. Response to Reform Proposals Questionnaire, Charles Field, Superior Court
Judge of Riverside County (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review)
[hereinafter Field Response].

87. Id.
88. A 1976 pilot program undertaken in Yuma County, Arizona, augurs well for
further experimentation with the barrister system. Funded by a grant from the Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration, responses of the participating attorneys
indicated the program's objectives were met and that an American barrister system

is workable. See James D. Cameron, The English BarristerSystem and the American
CriminalLaw: A ProposalforExperimentation,23 ARIz. L. REv. 991, 997 (1981).
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representation vastly improved[,] and reasonable settlements
would likely occur with more frequency."8 9
B. JudicialQuestioning: Respondents Were Asked if Judges
Should Question Witnesses Whenever the Attorneys Failto Pose
ImportantProbative Questions9o
Whatever the merits of the minimum skills approach in addressing the mismatching problem, it still leaves control of the trial
to the attorneys. The more attorney dominated and adversarial

the trial, the more likely the incidence of mismatching. In the

relatively nonadversarial inquisitorial trial method 91 -with which
the adversary system is often contrasted-the judge has the pri-

mary responsibility to conduct the inquiry by calling and questioning witnesses. 92 A common justification given for the greater
authority of the judge is the need to equalize the parties. 93
We need not replace wholesale the adversary system with the

inquisitorial system in order to ameliorate the mismatching prob89. Response to Reform Proposals Questionnaire, Thomas A. Black, Superior
Court Judge of Santa Cruz County (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Re-

view).

90. See infra app., tbl. 7. A companion question asked the respondents if judges
should question witnesses "in order to avoid an obvious injustice." The objective
was to gauge the extent of commitment to the traditional trial judge role of passivity
and nonintervention under the adversary system. Emblematic of this position is the
comment of Orange County Judge Dennis Choate, who wrote, "Most lawyers have
no idea how frustrating it is for a judge to watch them self[-]destruct before a jurybut the judge can not come to the rescue." Response to Reform Proposals Questionnaire, Dennis S. Choate, Superior Court Judge of Orange County (emphasis in
original) (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review). The notion that the
third-party adjudicator must generally remain passive in order to retain his or her
impartiality is peculiar to American jurisprudence. Our domestic alternative dispute
resolution mechanisms and the inquisitorial trial systems of Western Europe show
this to be a myth. No scientific findings suggest that inquiry intended merely to clarify induces a fatal loss of discipline.
As it turned out, the question response was lopsided: 93% answered affirmatively. Given the strength of this response, it could hardly be considered a
"reform" worthy of inclusion in the text. Apparently, the vast majority of judges already consider it their duty to question witnesses in order to avoid an obvious injustice.
91. The inquisitorial system is used most notably in the courts of continental
European countries. See Harold J. Berman & Charles J. Reid, Jr., The Transformation of English Legal Science: From Hale to Blackstone, 45 EMORY L.J. 437, 478
(1996). Thus it is sometimes referred to as the Continental System. See id. Worldwide, more countries use the inquisitorial system than the adversary system. See id.
92. See id.
93. See Neil Brooks, The Judge and the Adversary System, in THE CANADIAN
JUDICIARY 90, 111 (Allen M. Linden ed., 1976).
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lem and enhance the jury trial search for truth. Rather, we can
eclectically adopt one of the inquisitorial system's featuresjudicial questioning of witnesses. Many jurors share that view. In
the Los Angeles juror survey, supplemental questioning from the
judge was the suggestion selected most often by the jurors as
"effective or desirable" to counteract the results produced by
94
mismatched attorneys.
Other equally important advantages flow from judicial questioning. The judge can assist the jury by asking questions that an
incompetent or marginally competent attorney neglects to pose.
Another benefit is the reduced influence of lawyer theatrics and
dirty tricks.95 The occasional need for this judicial "safety net" escapes few who are familiar with adversary system trials.
It would betray a great naivet6 to deny that litigators would
regard anything more than an occasional question from the trial
judge as a dangerous deviation from current trial procedure. More
than a few judges would undoubtedly agree. Consider, for example, the impressions of Santa Clara County Judge Alden Danner:
"An attorney may not ask what appears to be a probative question
because the attorney has a tactic or strategy inconsistent with the
question. A judge may not recognize the tactic or strategy. Thus,
the judge may interfere with good attorney advocacy. ' 96
Nevertheless, this proposal garnered one of the largest affirmative responses-75% overall and 87% from appellate justices, the highest affirmative response from that subgroup. The
broad consensus may augur the adoption of reforms shifting procedural power from attorney to judge. Judicial rationalization for
this change could emanate from a variety of perceptions, including:
(a) the desire to assist the jury; (b) attorney incompetence or mismatching; and (c) responsiveness to public demand.

94. See Strier, supra note 82, at 79-80.
95. A complete taxonomy of trial attorney artifice would daunt the most ambitious writer. For an illustrative overview, see FRANKLIN D. STRIER, RECONSTRUCTING JUSTICE: AN AGENDA FOR TRIAL REFORM 160-65 and accompanying
notes (1994).
96. Response to Reform Proposals Questionnaire, Alden E. Danner, Superior
Court Judge of Santa Clara County (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
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C. JudicialSanctionsAgainst PretrialAbuses: Respondents Were
Asked if They Favored Greater Use of JudiciallyImposed
SanctionsAgainst Attorneys Guilty of Discovery Abuse or Dilatory
97
PretrialTactics
Delay can be a potent weapon in the trial attorney's arsenal.
Incentives abound: incriminating witnesses may die or disappear,
criminal defendants accused of nonviolent acts can usually remain
free upon posting bail, and civil defendants can defer the payment
of damages.
A related tactic is discovery abuse. Much of the blame for the
length and expense of adversarial trials can be attributed to attorney abuse of the discovery process. Few limits exist as to the
number of discovery requests a party can make as long as the requests are at least tenuously related to the action. 98
Initially, discovery was hailed as a boon to truth-seeking, fairness, and expedited case disposition. 99 No longer. Discovery
abuses now constitute the single greatest source of dispute, delay,
and cost in the trial system. 100 In the Harris survey abuse of the
discovery process was the most frequently cited cause of runaway
litigation costs. 101 A large majority said that attorneys' use of discovery "as an adversarial tool to intimidate or raise the stakes for
their opponents" was a major cause of excessive litigation costs. 102
According to former President George Bush's Council on Competitiveness, more than 80% of the time and cost of the typical
civil suit is attributable to discovery. 103
These sentiments were echoed in the present survey. Judge
Charles Field noted that the
[c]urrent system encourages unreasonable... and aggressive discovery[,] ... very little of which either benefits the
client or encourages reasonable resolution of the case.
The economics of the case, i.e., the resources available to
one side versus the other, often dominate the outcome as
97. See infra app., tbl. 8.
98. See Nathan L. Hecht, Discovery Lite!-The Consensusfor Reform, 15 REV.
LITIG. 267, 268-69 (1996).
99. See id.

100. See id. at 267-68.
101. See Louis Harris and Associates, Inc., supra note 58, at 750
102. See id.
103. See PRESIDENT'S

COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, AGENDA FOR CIVIL JUSTICE

REFORM IN AMERICA 3 (1991).
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much as mismatched attorney skills, because of the overemphasis on irrelevant discovery. 1°4
Judge Roger Randall concurred with respect to the economic
impact of discovery: "Greater attention should be paid to making
discovery processes less burdensome on the parties and also to
standardizing discovery methods with adequate sanctions for
abuse of discovery, so that there is a level playing field going into
the courtroom." 105
Depositions provide the "hardball" litigator with an especially
effective adversarial weapon. As University of Missouri Law Professor Wayne Brazil explained, "[b]ecause depositions can be used
to require the presence of the deponent for lengthy periods of
time, they also have great adversarial potential for harassing and
embarrassing adverse parties or witnesses and for disrupting their
lives and businesses."'11 6 A survey of Chicago litigators found a
similar widespread use of discovery as an aggressive tactical
weapon. 07 The idea, said one survey respondent, is to "see if you
can make them mad," to put them "through the wringer, through
the mud," so that "they are frightened to be a witness and.., are a
much worse witness."' 08
Not all discovery abuse emerges from unethical or illegitimate
motives. Fear of malpractice liability contributes to discovery
overuse. Like their physician counterparts who often leave no diagnostic tool unused-not because it is good medicine but out of
fear of malpractice lawsuits-so too attorneys take depositions
that are either too long or unnecessary, make document requests
that are too voluminous, and inflict word-processor-generated interrogatories that have little relevance to the issues in the case. 109
Consequently, excess discovery prices many would-be civil litigants out of the market. Judge William Schwarzer estimated that
discovery has made litigating a case for less than $200,000 "rarely

104. Field Response, supra note 86 (emphasis added).
105. Randall Response, supra note 68.
106. Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary Characterof Civil Discovery: A Critique
andProposalsfor Change,31 VAND. L. REv. 1295, 1329 (1978).

107. Wayne D. Brazil, Civil Discovery: Lawyers' Views on Its Effectiveness, Its
PrincipalProblemsandAbuses, AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 787,789-90 (1980).

108. Id. at 859.
109. See William W. Schwarzer, Slaying the Monsters of Cost and Delay: Would
DisclosureBe More Effective than Discovery?, 74 JUDICATURE 178, 178-79 (Dec.-Jan.
1991).

1270

LOYOLA OFLOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:1249

economically feasible."110 He concluded that "[iln short, the
transaction costs of dispute resolution have reached unaffordable
levels.""1 '
Other than mandatory disclosure, the most obvious remedy to
these problems is enhanced judicial oversight and control. Greater
judicial discretion to impose sanctions was the second most popular step-after time limits-to improve the discovery process
among the Harris survey judges." 2 In the present survey greater
use of judicial sanctions against pretrial attorney abuse was the
most popular reform, receiving an 83% affirmative response.
D. Neutral Expert Witnesses: Respondents Were Asked if Courts
3
Should Make GreaterUse of Court-CalledExpert Witnesses"
In a potential watershed development, federal Judge Samuel
Pointer, presiding over a consolidated federal docket of more than
21,000 breast implant lawsuits, recently appointed a national panel
of experts to advise the court. 114 The panel's charge was to evaluate widely conflicting scientific studies on the link between gel
breast implants and various diseases." 5 Does this presage a trend?
If it facilitates resolution of cases, such panels, and courtappointed experts in general, may indeed proliferate-a departure
from the norm.
The use of expert testimony is on the upswing. Indeed, the
sale of expert testimony has become a growth industry in a dazzling array of fields. The parade of expert witnesses in the Simpson case, 116 for example, included specialists in ice cream and
men's gloves. Studies show juries attach great weight to expert
testimony." 7 Thus, the hiring of an expert witness by one side
strategically compels the other side to follow suit.
Current trial practice almost always confines expert testimony
to the partisan experts hired by the parties-often to the detriment
110. Id at 179.
111. Id.
112. See Louis Harris and Associates, Inc., supra note 58, at 738.

113. See infra app., tbl. 9.
114. See Julie Gannon Shoop, Court Orders Search for Neutral Experts in Breast
Implant Litigation,TRIAL, Aug. 1996, at 15, 16.
115. See id.

116. People v. Simpson, No. BA097211 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. County Oct. 3,
1995).
117. See, e.g., Allan Raitz et al., Determining Damages: The Influence of Expert
Testimony on Jurors'Decision Making, 14 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 385, 393 (1990).
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118
of the fact finder. As illustration, consider the Simpson case,
which etched a sorry but increasingly common courtroom tableau.
Jurors became stupefied by the sharply competing testimonies of
opposing experts. Juror attention visibly waned. What was supposed to be educative was instead combative and perplexing. This
"battle of the experts" tends to confound juries.
The main problem is distortion. Powerful financial incentives
induce hired expert witnesses to slant their opinions in order to
satisfy their attorney clients. This exaggerates differences, minimizes consensus, and profoundly confuses jurors. Prolonged interrogation of expert witnesses usually leaves the jurors more puzzled
than informed, more weary than focused.
Adversarial misuse of expert testimony exacerbates the situation. Overzealous attorneys often knowingly elicit dubious and
unsubstantiated views from their experts. Because educating the
jury may be at the bottom of the attorney's agenda, public cynicism towards expert testimony mounts.
Bored, confused, or both, jurors frequently give mind to the
wrong things. Too often they attend to the personal characteristics
of expert witnesses instead of the quality of their testimony. Jurors
are easily enthralled by the expert who is the most engaging or superficially persuasive rather than the most authoritative.
These problems are avoidable. Judges could call their own
experts to testify. Using federal procedure as an illustration, the
Federal Rules of Evidence codify and particularize the inherent
power of the trial judge by giving the trial court broad discretion to
appoint an expert witness sua sponte or on the motion of any of
the parties. 119 The Rule sets out a relatively clear set of procedures to govern the process.
Reluctant to consume valuable court time in appointing experts and wary these experts would unduly influence jurors, judges
rarely exercise this prerogative. 120 Nevertheless, extreme contradictions in the testimonies of the partisan experts that bewilder the

118. People v. Simpson, No. BA097211 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. County Oct. 3,
1995).
119. See FED. R. EVID. 706.
120. See PANEL ON STATISTICAL ASSESSMENTS AS EVIDENCE IN THE COURTS,
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE EVOLVING ROLE OF STATISTICAL ASSESSMENTS
AS EVIDENCE IN THE COURTS (Stephen E. Fienberg ed., 1989); JOE S. CECIL &
DEFINING THE ROLE OF
THOMAS E. WILLGING, COURT-APPOINTED EXPERTS:
EXPERTS APPOINTED UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 706 (1993).
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jury warrant the appointment of impartial expert witnesses. 21 The
benefits are considerable.
Court-appointed expert witnesses would be compensated by
the court-the cost being passed on to the parties as the court directs122-with desirable results. Compensation begets allegiance.
Court-based compensation would remove the financial pressure on
expert witnesses to slant their testimonies. The impartiality and
competence of the court-appointed expert would assist, rather
than addle, the jury in reaching an informed verdict. Further, the
tempering effect of the impartial expert may have a prophylactic
effect on the excesses of the partisan experts and result in more
settlements.
Expert witnesses are most often used in complex civil cases. In
such cases a majority of the judges in the Harris survey favored the
use of neutral expert witnesses in addition to those called by the
parties. 23 Judge Roger Randall suggested how this might be facilitated:
As more and more courts in California go to direct calendaring of cases, it will be easier for the courts to identify
cases at an early stage which need court appointed experts. I believe court appointed experts can avoid a great
deal of confusion in the battle of the experts. 24
IV.

CONCLUSION

With trial reform either recently effectuated, in process, or
gaining prominence in several states, public attention increasingly
shifts to judges, who are necessarily the linchpins of the process.
The findings of this survey indicate that the judiciary may be more
receptive to various procedural reforms than might popularly be
believed-the conventional perception being that judges are conservative about such changes. Although only California judges
were surveyed, the size of the survey population and the breadth
of attitudes amongst our largest state's judiciary suggest that the
findings may be extrapolated to the judiciary nationwide.
Judges strongly favored reforms geared towards improving juror comprehension of the evidence, thus the judicial support for
121. See Eastern Air Lines v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957, 1000 (5th
Cir. 1976).
122. See FED. R. EVID. 706(b).
123. See Louis Harris and Associates, Inc., supra note 58, at 741.
124. Randall Response, supra note 68.
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juror questions and issue separation. Collectively, these measures
enhance independent juror fact finding while simplifying and
properly categorizing the evidence free of any attorney influence.' 5 Similar judicial support was found for reforms facilitating
juror understanding of the law: juror preinstruction and improved
juror orientation. Judges also favored greater use of special verdicts, which either relieve jurors of applying the law or enable
judges to specifically monitor the accuracy of the application. Of
distinct significance is that several of the proposed jury reforms
supported by the surveyed judges-juror questions, improved orilater recommended by the
entation, and preinstruction-were
126
Commission.
Ribbon
Blue
Reforms intended to counter the untoward effects of attorney
domination or mismatching earned judicial backing as well. Requiring minimum advocacy skills for trial representation and urging more judicial questioning when attorneys fail to pose important probative questions each mitigate the injustice inherent in the
presence of attorney incompetence or mismatched opposing attorneys. More consequential sanctions against pretrial discovery
abuses and greater use of court-appointed neutral expert witnesses
may salutarily reallocate procedural power from attorney to judge
while retaining the essential adversariness of the trial.127
This survey will hopefully be a prologue to future efforts. In
the context of trial reform, research should replace rhetoric. Empirical research is not necessarily the answer; it is, however, the
preferred starting point in determining the desired direction of
trial reform policy. As recently argued, "[i]mproving the civil justice system requires thoughtful, objective analysis based on sound
empirical data. The lack of systematic, cumulative data in this
be adarea makes it possible for far-reaching policy proposals to 128
vanced on the basis of tendentious anecdotes and numbers.'
125. Other similar proposals received substantial if not majority approval. Unin-

terrupted opening narratives by witnesses-40%; written transcripts of the testimony

for jurors-30%; and videotaped copies of the testimony-39%; all amassed sizable

affirmation.
126. See BLUE RIBBON COMM'N REPORT, supra note 3, at 80-81, 83-87, 90-93
(Recommendations 5.1, 5.3, and 5.6).

127. The endorsements of issue separation and court-appointed expert witnesses
confirmed the sentiments of the judges in the major prior survey of judicial opinions..

See Louis Harris and Associates, Inc., supra note 58, at 738-45.
128. Marc Galanter et al., How to Improve Civil JusticePolicy: Systematic Collec-

tion of Data on the Civil Justice System Is Needed for Reasoned and Effective Policy
Making, 77 JUDICATURE 185 (1994).
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Research without clearly articulated purpose, however, yields
information, not knowledge. In pursuing our research agenda, we
need to look not only at what the trial players-judges, attorneys,
jurors, parties-do, but also at what they think and feel. Is it not
equally as important, for example, to know what judges and jurors
think the purpose of damage awards are or should be as it is to
know what they have awarded? Only when norms are articulated
do we have a baseline to measure the extent that practice deviates
from standards. Then we can devise corrective measures. In short,
values should drive policy, and reforms should effectuate policy.
Accordingly, research should first identify the operative
norms underlying our ideal trial justice system. The values so articulated should suggest lines of research inquiry designed to
bridge the gap between theory and practice. Herewith, an illustrative sampling of proposed research topics: What kinds of disputes do we want juries-rather than judges, special panels, or alternative dispute resolution mechanisms-to try?
How can
technology make jury service more convenient? What is the ideal
balance of attorney-judge power over the trial inquiry? What
changes could improve jury performance without impairing the
litigants' rights to a fair trial? These findings will, in turn, inform
subsequent research seeking the optimal means of realizing the revealed values.
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APPENDIX
Analysis of Responses to Reform ProposalsFavored by a Majority of Those Responding
Figures represent percentages. "Always" or "Sometimes" responses were considered affirmative.
TABLE 1. IMPROVED JURY ORIENTATION
Total
Sometimes
Always
61
13
48
Trial
57
20
37
Appellate
61
14
47
Combined

Trial
Appellate
Combined

TABLE 2. PREINSTR UCTION
Sometimes
Always
10
70
12
64
10
70

Total
80
76
80

Trial
Appellate
Combined

TABLE 3. JUROR QUESTIONS
Sometimes
Always
13
48
20
37
14
47

Total
61
57
61

Trial
Appellate
Combined

TABLE 4. ISSUE SEPARATION
Sometimes
Always
16
52
7
63
16
53

Total
68
70
69
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TABLE 5. SPECIAL VERDICT FORMS
Total
Sometimes
Always
64
10
54
Trial
65
13
52
Appellat
64
10
d
54
Combine
TABLE 6. MINIMUM ADVOCACY SKILLS
Total
Sometimes
Always
2
69
67
Trial
56
56
Appellat e
1
67
66
Combine d

Trial
Appellat e
Combine d

TABLE 7. JUDICIAL QUESTIONING
Total
Sometimes
Always
74
15
59
87
79
8
75

Trial
Appellat e
Combine d

TABLE 8. JUDICIAL SANCTIONS
AGAINST PRETRIAL AB USES
Total
Sometimes
Always
84
6
78
9
64
73
7
76
83

TABLE 9. NEUTRAL EXPERT WITNESSES
Total
Sometimes
Always
57
17
40
Trial
48
13
35
Appellate
56
16
40
Combined

